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Abstract The aim of this paper is to strengthen the point made by Horty about the
relationship between reason holism and moral particularism. In the literature prima
facie obligations have been considered as the only source of reason holism.
I strengthen Horty’s point in two ways. First, I show that contrary-to-duties provide
another independent support for reason holism. Next I outline a formal theory that is
able to capture these two sources of holism. While in simple settings the proposed
account coincides with Horty’s one, this is not true in more complicated or ‘‘real-
istic’’ settings in which more than two norms collide. My chosen formalism is so-
called input/output logic. A bottom-line example is introduced. It raises the issue of
whether the conventional wisdom is right in assuming that normative reasons run
parallel to epistemic ones.
Keywords Moral particularism  Prima facie obligation  Conflict resolution 
Priorities  Contrary-to-duties  Default reason  Input/output logic
1 Introduction
In this paper I present a variant to Horty’s theory for reasoning with prioritized
(deontic or epistemic) defaults presented in Horty (2007a, b). There the framework
is used to shed light on the on-going debate on so-called moral particularism,
launched in moral philosophy by the British philosopher Dancy (1993, 2006).
Neither Dancy nor Horty see the connection with contrary-to-duties and norm
violations. I will argue that these are highly relevant to the latter debate, and
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investigate how Horty’s framework copes with them. Next I will present an
alternative way to handle prioritized defaults in the setting of input-output logic
(IOL), and show that while in simple settings both accounts coincide, this is not true
in more complicated or ‘‘realistic’’ settings in which more than two norms collide.
The bottom-line is whether normative reasons (reasons for action) run in parallel to
epistemic ones (reasons for belief).
2 Moral particularism
Not long ago there was a debate running on Brian Leiter’s Legal Philosophy blog1
about why there is so little interest in deontic logic (and in the formal semantics of
normative concepts) on the part of other academic disciplines, like moral
philosophy. To get them more interested in deontic logic, we need to show them
how the latter one can contribute to the issues they are discussing. The paper (Horty
2007b) by Horty can be seen as an attempt to do it. There the focus is on so-called
moral particularism, a justly popular ‘‘cutting-edge’’ topic in contemporary ethics
that has been most notably defended by the British moral philosopher Dancy (1993,
2006).2 Moral particularism—or situationism, as it has sometimes been called—
seems to present an especially radical objection to the enterprise of moral theory,
and hence of deontic logic. To put it simply, particularism is the view that there are
no moral principles, only moral intuitions. In his paper Horty examines and
criticizes the main argument Dancy gives in support of his view.
First, Dancy’s argument. Particularism is a negative thesis on how moral
reasoning works. Dancy calls ‘‘generalism’’ the view that ‘‘the very possibility of
moral thought and judgement depends on the provision of a suitable supply of moral
principles’’ (Dancy 2006, p. 73). This is the traditional approach in moral theory.
Particularism can be viewed as the negation of the latter view. It is the claim that
‘‘the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not depend on the provision of
a suitable supply of moral principles’’ (Dancy 2006, p. 73). There is, then, the
obvious issue of explaining what moral reasoning is. Particularists do not say much
about it, and here no attempt will be made to discuss this issue.3
In this paper I shall focus on another point of controversy. It is that Dancy
grounds his claim on a form of reason holism, holding that what is a reason in one
case need not be any reason in another: ‘‘Reasons are like rats, at least to the extent
that two rats that are supposedly on the same side may in fact turn and fight among
themselves’’ (Dancy 2006, p. 15). The main support he provides in support of
holism in the theory of reasons comes in the form of examples, in which the notion
of prima facie obligation takes centre stage. The latter notion was introduced in
moral philosophy by Ross (1930). A prima facie obligation is one that binds unless
1 http://leiterlegalphilosophy.typepad.com/leiter/2007/10/green-v-shapiro.html.
2 Dancy’s views were historically developed in response to Hare.





overridden by another stronger obligation, and so it is defeasible: it leaves room for
exceptions.
It is natural to ask if moral particularism is any different from moral relativism,
which is sometimes said to be ‘‘self-defeating’’.4 Before explaining why I think the
worry is misconceived, I would like to make a clarification. In fact, Dancy
emphasizes that holism about reasons is consistent with the existence of what he
calls ‘‘invariant’’ reasons—considerations that function as reasons with the same
valence in all circumstances. An example is: causing gratuitous pain to an unwilling
victim. Holism about reasons only maintains that there is nothing about being a
reason that precludes the context-sensitivity of reasons. It is compatible with this
that certain kinds of reasons are not context-sensitive. Such reasons are invariant not
because they are reasons but because of their specific content.5
Here, I will put the above subtlety to one side, and I will assume that the
particularist thesis is best formulated as the denial of moral principles. It is under
this formulation that it is more likely to be vulnerable to the charge of incoherence.
Relativism says that truth or knowledge is always relative to some parameter
(historical circumstances, culture, conceptual framework, etc.). The usual objection
to relativism, as first developed by Plato against Protagoras in the Theaetetus (see
Cooper and John 1997), involves applying relativism to itself, in order to undermine
it. In Plato’s days such an objection used to be described as a peritrope (a turning of
the tables).6 In the case of particularism, the principle that is turned against itself is
‘‘moral principles do not exist’’. The position becomes self-refuting in the moment it
is used as a reason to motivate moral maxims such as ‘‘don’t act in accordance to
any principle’’, which is itself a principle. Husserl (1988, A) acknowledges the
conceivability of using moral relativism this way.7 I think such a move is
understandable, but just wrong. It amounts to conflating two kinds of principles that
are, in nature, very different. Following Bennet (1995), Mackie (1977, p. 16, 106)
distinguishes between first-order and second-order moral views. A first-order moral
view is a claim about what is good or bad. A second-order moral view is a claim
about the nature of first-order moral views (e.g., what it is for something to be good
or bad). First-order and second-order views address separate and independent
matters. The particularist views his original charge only as a second-order claim,
without committing himself to any first-order moral view. Turned into a first-order
moral view, particularism would be closed to moral nihilism, that is the view that
anything is morally permissible. According to Mackie, the idea that there is a logical
connection between (second-order) relativism and (first-order) moral nihilism rests
on a mistake. I think the same can be said of particularism. Indeed, the relativist is
4 This objection was raised by a reviewer for DEON’10.
5 Cf. Dancy (2006, p. 77). The assumption that reasons are general as part of their meaning plays an
important role in Hare’s analysis of the universalizability of ought-statements. Asking why the word
‘‘ought’’ has the property of universalizability, Hare gives the following reason among others: an
‘‘ought’’-judgment must be supported by a reason; and this implies that the same judgment must be made
whenever the same reason holds (cf. Hare 1952, p. 176, 1963, p. 21).
6 A good exposition and judicious appraisal of the arguments by which the Ancients sought to refute the
assumptions they took to underpin Protagorean relativism can be found in Lee (2005).
7 This was pointed out to me by one referee.
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pluralist. He believes that on any moral question there can be more than one correct
answer. The particularist still maintains that each particular action is either
objectively obligatory or not, depending on the precise details of the situation in
question.
Here I find it convenient to use the by now familiar type-token distinction. A type
is a concept, and its tokens are the particular objects that instantiate it. For example,
the particular bicycle in your garage is a token of the type of thing known as ‘‘The
bicycle’’. The bicycle in your garage is in a particular place at a particular time. This
is not true of ‘‘the bicycle’’ as used in the sentence ‘‘The bicycle has become more
popular recently’’. A particularist denies that there is one ‘‘correct’’ moral answer in
any situation viewed as a type. But he admits that there can be one correct answer
only in a given token situation (e.g. this lying, hic et nunc). What the particularist
denies is that an answer, which appears to be right in a given token situation, can be
codified in the form of a principle, which will be applied to the same situation again
and again.
With these preliminaries out of the way, I can get back to Horty’s paper.
What he does in there can be described as an attack on attack. He builds a
formal theory of reasons, which challenges the connection made between reason
holism and particularism. The proposed framework supports reason holism: a
reason need not retain its supporting value across contexts. Yet, it is based on a
system of principles. These are thought of as defeasible generalizations. So the
framework provides a counter-example to the claim that reason holism implies
particularism.
I agree with the main point made by Horty. However what is missing from his
discussion is the notion of contrary-to-duty (CTD) obligation—a highly problematic
topic in deontic logic. Neither Dancy nor Horty see the relevance of CTDs to the
topic under discussion. But let us have a look at the kind of examples used by the
former to justify reason holism:8
The book
Case 1 My borrowing a book from you is a reason to return it to you
Case 2 My borrowing a book from you is not a reason to return it to you, since
you’ve stolen it from the library
This example has the form:
Case 1 A is a reason for B
Case 2 A is not a reason for B, since C
The example originally used by Chisholm to make his point about contrary-to-duties
(see Chisholm 1963) can also be given this form. The example consists of the
following sentences: (i) it ought to be that I go to the assistance of my neighbours
(ii) it ought to be that if I go I tell them I am coming (iii) it ought to be that if I do
not go I do not tell them I am coming (iv) I do not go. From (i)–(iv), we can extract:





Case 1 My being obliged to go is a reason for telling
Case 2 My being obliged to go is not a reason for telling, since it turns out that I
do not go.
In a violation context, the primary obligation to go to the assistance remains in
force. Is it to say that it remains a reason for telling? Obviously, not. For (iii)
provides (iv) as a (stronger) reason not to tell.
The above considerations show that some CTD scenarios give another
independent support for reason holism. Horty’s framework was not devised to deal
with the latter scenarios. In the next section, I investigate how the theory copes with
them. The hope is to show that a stronger statement about the relationship between
reason holism and particularism can be made by showing that the framework can
deal with both sources of holism.
The idea is to analyze contrary-to-duty reasoning as one that is defeasible. A
reasoning is defeasible if is based on reasons that may be defeated in the light of
further information. Originality is not my claim. This kind of approach to CTDs has
a long tradition which begun with Nute and Donald (1997). Still, I am not aware of a
theory (from that tradition) that takes reasons as the basic normative concept.
3 Horty’s framework
First, I give an outline of Horty’s framework, focusing for the purposes of the
present analysis on the special case where all priority relations among defaults are
fixed in advance. I will incorporate the amendments to the framework proposed in
Horty (2007a).
Reiter’s default logic (Reiter 1980) is one of the best known and most widely
used formalisms in the Artificial Intelligence (AI) research community. To make his
point, Horty could have tried to use one of the prioritized variants of it that have
been described in the literature (see, e.g., Brewka and Eiter 2000). However, none of
them seem to be very suitable for the specific purpose Horty has in mind, primarily
because particularists speak in terms of reasons. Following a suggestion of Raz
(1999), they take reasons as the basic normative concept. Horty’s account can be
viewed as an attempt to recast Reiter’s default logic into particularists’ language, so
they can relate to it better.
An ordered default theory is notated (W, D, \). W is a set of propositional formulae.
They represent the knowledge the agent has about the current situation. D a set of
defaults subject to a strict partial ordering\. Defaults are of the form A ! B; where?
stands for material implication. They can be given both an epistemic and a deontic
reading. In the first case, the conclusion or head B denotes a fact, and A ! B expresses
a reason to believe. In the second case, B denotes the content of an obligation, and
A ! B expresses a reason for acting. d\ d0 means that d0 has a higher priority than d.
The representation of norms as ‘‘A is a reason for B’’ may make some readers feel
uncomfortable. At first sight this kind of representation does not allow us to capture a
number of distinctions that have proved to be useful, like the distinction between
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so-called regulative and constitutive norms. The first describe obligations, prohibi-
tions and permissions. The second make possible basic ‘‘institutional’’ actions such
as the making of contracts, the issuing of fines, the decreeing of divorces. Basically
they tell us what counts as what for a given institution.9 The framework described
here was not devised to deal with constitutive norms. Still, room can be made for
them if we accept to interpret constitutive norms as a type of epistemic reasons. On
this account, a proposal followed by an acceptance is an epistemic reason to consider
the contract as binding. In this respect, a proposal followed by an acceptance counts
as a contract. By contrast, the parties promising to make a contract is a normative
reason for them to make the contract. Both norms have the same conclusion
‘‘contract’’. The constitutive norm describes it as a fact, which happens to be
institutional. The regulative norm describes it as a cue to action.10
Before discussing Horty’s framework, I need to introduce some further notation.
If d is the default A ! B; for example, then Premise(d) is the statement A and
Conclusion(d) is the statement B. Where D is a set of defaults, Conclusion(D) is a
shorthand for fConclusionðdÞ : d 2 Dg: ‘ denotes classical consequence. Where X
is a set of formulae, Cn(X) denotes the closure of X under ‘.
Like in Reiter’s default logic, the goal is to determine the extension(s) associated
with a default theory (W, D, \). Intuitively, an extension gathers all the agent’s
obligations that follow from what it knows about the world. However, the notion of
extension is here not as central as it is in Reiter’s theory. The key concept is that of
(as Horty calls it)‘‘proper scenario(s)’’ (Horty 2007b, p. 8) based on a default theory.
A proper scenario is notated S, and is always a subset of the set of all the defaults D.
Intuitively, the defaults in a proper scenario tell us what counts as a binding (good,
satisfactory, etc.) reason for what. Thus, if A ! B is in the proper scenario S based
on a given default theory, then S is said to provide A as a reason for B. The idea is to
assume that the agent derives its obligations (part of the extension) from
justifications or reasons for those obligations: in particular, that the agent is
bounded by an obligation if it possesses a satisfactory reason for that obligation.
Formally, the notion of proper scenario is defined using three other notions. Each
corresponds to a condition that a default must meet in order to be binding.
The first notion is that of a default being triggered in scenario S. Let us use the
notation TriggeredðW;D;\ÞðSÞ to refer to the set of all such defaults. The definition
runs as follows:
TriggeredðW ;D;\ÞðSÞ ¼ fd 2 D : W [ ConclusionðSÞ ‘ PremiseðdÞg
The second notion is that of a default being conflicted in S. Let ConflictedðW;D;\ÞðSÞ
denote the set of all such defaults. The definition reads:
9 The idea of constitutive rule is a theme that goes back to Searle (1964, 1969), and before that to Rawls
(1955). For a comprehensive overview of the state of the art about logics for constitutive norms, see
Grossi and Jones (2011).
10 The promise example is for illustrative purposes only. Here I take the principle of promise-keeping to
be a regulative norm, as does Ross in his theory of prima facie duties. He sees the principle of promise-
keeping as falling under (as he calls it) the ‘‘duty of fidelity’’. It is common in the philosophy of language
to think of such a rule as constitutive of the act of promising. This view, which was championed by Searle




ConflictedðW ;D;\ÞðSÞ ¼ fd 2 D : W [ ConclusionðSÞ ‘ :ConclusionðdÞg
The third notion is that of a default being defeated in S. Let DefeatedðW;D;\ÞðSÞ
denote the set of all such defaults. For D; D0  S; put D \ D0 if d\ d0 for all d in
D and d0 in D0. Let SS
0/D0 denote the result of replacing S0 by D0 in S, viz.
SS
0/D0 = (S - S0) [ D0. The definition of defeat reads:
DefeatedðW ;D;\ÞðSÞ ¼ d2D : 9D0  TriggeredðW;D;\ÞðSÞ s:t:

aÞ fdg\D0 and
bÞ 9S0  S with S0\D0 such that
W [ ConclusionðSS0=D0 Þ is consistent
W [ ConclusionðSS0=D0 Þ ‘ :ConclusionðdÞ
o
These three concepts are used to define the notion of a default being binding in
S. Let BindingðW;D;\ÞðSÞ denote the set of all such defaults. The definition reads:
BindingðW;D;\ÞðSÞ ¼ fd 2D : d 2 TriggeredðW ;D;\ÞðSÞ
d 62 ConflictedðW ;D;\ÞðSÞ
d 62 DefeatedðW ;D;\ÞðSÞg
The notion of proper scenario is defined using what is sometimes called a ‘‘quasi-
induction’’ or, in the terminology of Makinson (1994), an ‘‘end-regulated
induction’’. This looks like an ordinary induction except that the induction step
makes reference to the object to be defined. While end-regulated inductions look
like genuine inductions, logically they behave like fixpoint definitions.
Definition 1 (Proper scenario) Let S be a scenario based on the ordered default





Si ¼ fd 2 D : d 2 TriggeredðW ;D;\ÞðSi1Þ; d 62 ConflictedðW;D;\ÞðSÞ;
d 62 DefeatedðW ;D;\ÞðSÞg
Definition 1 exemplifies an approach to handling inconsistency that is familiar from
the literature on so-called non-monotonic reasoning. I shall refer to it as the
‘‘increment idea’’. The key to the proposal is to restrict the step-by-step application
of defaults in order to guard against possible contradictions. The agent begins its
reasoning process, at the initial stage S0, without believing in any defaults. Then, at
each successive stage Si, it supplements its stock of defaults with those that have
been triggered at the previous stage Si-1 as long as they are neither conflicted nor
defeated. Note that, at each stage Si, the constraining scenario against which the
agent checks defaults for conflict or defeat is S itself.
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With these concepts in place, it is a straightforward matter to define the notion of
extension. Intuitively, the extension of a default theory can be viewed as the set of
obligations generated by a proper scenario. The following formal characterization
suggests itself—it is taken from Horty (2007a).
Definition 2 (Extension) Let (W, D, \) be an ordered default theory and E a set of
formulae. Then E is an extension of (W, D, \) just in case E ¼ CnðW [ SÞ; where S
is a proper scenario based on this default theory.
It seems that the intuitions behind Horty’s framework are fundamentally different
from those behind the usual non-monotonic systems for legal argumentation, like
the system of Prakken and Sartor (1997). Such systems separate the process of
argument construction from that of argument evaluation. By contrast, Horty’s
framework interleaves the construction and evaluation of arguments. Furthermore,
in such systems acceptability in the face of iterated undermining and support is
decided using the so-called principle of reinstatement. It is the idea that an argument
should count as acceptable even if it is defeated, as long as all the arguments
defeating it are themselves defeated. In Horty (2001), Horty gives a counter-
example (known as the ‘‘Microsoft scenario’’) to such a principle. We will see that
his own framework gets the example right.
Below I apply the construction to the two examples from Sect. 2 used to justify
reason holism, and show that the construction yields the correct outcomes.
Example 1 (The book) Let b, s, y and l represent the respective propositions that I
borrowed the book from you, that you stole it from the library, that I return the book to you,
and that I return it to the library. Put D ¼ fb ! y; s ! lgwith s ! l [ b ! y: Assume
W ¼ fy ! :lg—I cannot simultaneously return the book to you and the library.
Case 1 Suppose that W contains, in addition, the sole formula b. In this case, the
ordered default theory (W, D, \) yields S1 ¼ fb ! yg as its unique proper
scenario, providing b as a reason for y.
Case 2 Suppose that W contains, in addition, the two formulae b and s. In this
case, the ordered default theory (W, D, \) yields S2 ¼ fs ! lg as its
unique proper scenario, and thereby provides s as a reason for l, rather
than providing b as a reason for y.
Example 2 (The neighbours) Let a and t represent the respective propositions that I
go to the assistance of my neighbours, and that I tell them I am coming. Put D ¼
f> ! a; a ! t;:a ! :tgwith\the empty relation. Note that in the case of an empty
priority relation the notion of defeat plays no role, because DefeatedðW ;D;;Þ (S) = ;
Case 1 Suppose that W contains no formula, W = ;. In this case, the ordered
default theory (W, D, \) yields S3 ¼ f> ! a; a ! tg as its unique proper
scenario, providing a as a reason for t.
Case 2 Suppose that W contains the formula :a: In this case, the ordered default
theory (W, D, \) yields S4 ¼ f:a ! :tg as its unique proper scenario,




Multiple level of violation may be analyzed in the same way.
Example 3 (Multiple level of violation) Put D ¼ f> ! :a; a ! x; a ^ :x ! yg;
where a is for breaking one’s promise, x is for apologizing, and y is for being
ashamed. Let \ be the empty relation.
Case 1 Assume W = ;. In this case, the ordered default theory (W, D, \) yields
S5 ¼ f> ! :ag as its unique proper scenario.
Case 2 Assume W = {a}. In this case, the ordered default theory (W, D, \) yields
S6 ¼ fa ! xg as its unique proper scenario.
Case 3 Assume W ¼ fa;:xg: The solution is S7 ¼ fa ^ :x ! yg:
These examples are simple cases of reason holism. Horty’s theory appears to handle
them relatively well. In the next section I will argue that the theory is not adequate
for a more complex case of reason holism. Before showing it, I need to introduce an
alternative framework based on so-called constrained input/output logic (IOL),
which will allow me to handle this more complex case of reason holism in—I
believe—a more satisfactory way.
4 Constrained IOL with priorities
For clarity’s sake, I proceed in three steps. I first give an outline of unconstrained
IOL, on top of which constrained IOL is built. Next, I introduce constraints. Finally
I add priorities to the framework.11
To keep things simple, I only consider obligations—permissions are put to one
side. In input/output logic, a normative code is a set G of conditional norms, which
is a set of ordered pairs (a, x). Here a and x are two formulae of propositional logic.
Each such pair will be referred to as a generator. The body a is thought of as an
input, representing some condition or situation, and the head x is thought of as an
output, representing what the norm tells us to be obligatory in that situation.
Some notation. L is the set of all formulae of propositional logic. Given an input
A  L; and a set of generators G, G(A) denotes the image of G under A, i.e.,
GðAÞ ¼ fx : ða; xÞ 2 G for some a 2 Ag:
Definition 3 (Output operations) Let A be an input set, and let G be a set of
generators. The following input/output operations can be defined, where a complete
set is one that is either maximal consistent12 or equal to L:
out1ðG; AÞ ¼ CnðGðCnðAÞÞÞ
out2ðG; AÞ ¼ \fCnðGðVÞÞ : A  V; V completeg
out3ðG; AÞ ¼ \fCnðGðBÞÞ : A  B  CnðBÞ  GðBÞg
out4ðG; AÞ ¼ \fCnðGðVÞÞ : A  V  GðVÞ; V completeg
11 My exposition of (unprioritized) IOL is confined to what is essential in the present context. For a more
comprehensive account, the reader is referred to Makinson and van der Torre (2000, 2001).
12 The set is consistent, and none of its proper extensions is consistent.
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out1(G, A), out2(G, A), out3(G, A) and out4(G, A) are called simple-minded
output, basic output, reusable simple-minded output and reusable basic output,
respectively.
When analyzing examples, I will occasionally choose to instantiate out into either
out3 or out4. This is because these two operations satisfy plain transitivity (‘‘from
(a, x) and (x, y) infer (a, y)’’). With such a property it is much easier to get an
intuitive feeling of what is going on.
It will help to recast Horty’s theory into the Input/Output (I/O) idiom in order to
facilitate comparison between the two accounts. In fact, the definition of the key
concepts in Horty’s approach can easily be adapted to the notational conventions
used in I/O logic. His W corresponds to our A. The set of all defaults D corresponds
to our G. We write (a, x) where Horty uses its materialization a ! x: The definition
of a default being triggered in scenario S  G becomes the following, where h(S) is
the set of heads y of elements of S:
TriggeredðA;G;\ÞðSÞ ¼ fða; xÞ 2 G : A [ hðSÞ ‘ ag
Some might wonder if ‘ can be replaced with some appropriately chosen output
operation. The answer is yes, but I do not think that in the present context this would
yield any useful insight. For instance, Stolpe (2010) points out a limiting case where
out1 collapses into classical logic. It is the case where the set of generators is the
diagonal relation over L.13 We get a reformulation along the lines:
TriggeredðA;G;\ÞðSÞ ¼ fða; xÞ 2 G : a 2 out1ðL  L; A [ hðSÞÞg
For the other notions, the reformulation is similar. The notion of extension requires one
more small change. We need to put: E is an extension if E ¼ CnðA [ mðSÞÞ; where S is
a proper scenario, and m(S) is the materialization of S, i.e. the set of all formulae a ! x
where ða; xÞ 2 S: Alternatively, E is an extension if E ¼ outþ4 ðS; AÞ:14
Now we can turn to IOL with constraints. The motivation is best explained
by considering the case of a conflict between two obligations. Put G ¼
fða; xÞ; ða;:xÞg; and consider input a. The reader may easily verify that, for all
output operations, out(G, a) = L. This shows that none of the operations considered
so far are conflict-tolerant. The idea is to cut back the set of norms to just below the
threshold of yielding excess, and consider the resulting output. To do that, we look
at the maximal non-excessive subsets, i.e. the maximal G0  G such that
out(G0, A) is consistent. The family of all such G0 may be called the maxfamily of
A, and the family of outputs out(G0, A) for G0 in the maxfamily, may be called the
outfamily of A. Below this maximal subsets strategy is referred to as the
‘‘threshold idea’’. It gives IOL its distinctive flavour compared to other non-
monotonic frameworks. The main idea is to perform on G the minimal changes
required in order to avoid contradictions (or any other consequences specified as
13 This is (Stolpe 2010, theorem 2).
14 Cf. Makinson and van der Torre (2000, observation 16). outþi ði ¼ 1; . . .; 4Þ is the throughput version of
outi that allows inputs to reappear as outputs. In terms of the semantical definitions, we have
outi




undesirable). This is slightly different from restraining the step-by-step application
of rules. Formulated in such general terms, this may seem a rather nebulous and
inconsequential distinction to make. In fact, this makes a real difference, as we
will see in due course.15
The example I have just used to motivate the approach involves what might be
called a ‘‘strict’’ or logical conflict: the head of one rule contradicts the head of the
other. The point that has been made about such conflicts also applies to ‘‘natural’’
(or non-strict) conflicts. These are of the form: (a, x) and (a, y), with x incompatible
with y in the sense of natural or physical necessity, broadly conceived. The
treatment of this type of conflict necessitates the use of a set C of ‘‘integrity
constraints’’ (as they are sometimes called) that the output is never allowed to
contradict. In this case, C ¼ fx ! :yg: This is meant to indicate that x and y cannot
be simultaneously true, given the agent’s present physical and psychical capabil-
ities, etc. Compared to the treatment of a strict conflict, the main difference is that
we take the maximal G0  G such that out(G0, A) is consistent with C. Example 4
below provides an illustration.
For contrary-to-duties, the idea is similar. Typically we take the maximal G0  G
such that out(G0, A) is consistent with A. It is easy to check that not doing so would
create the same problems as those encountered in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL).
This is illustrated clearly by example 6.
The formal definition below is general, covering as special case both
inconsistency of output and its inconsistency with input.
Definition 4 (Threshold) Let G be a set of generators and out be an input/output
operation. Let C be an arbitrary set of formulae, which we may call ‘‘consistency
constraints’’. We define:
– maxfamily(G, A, C) is the set of -maximal subsets G0 of G such that
out(G0, A) is consistent with C.
– outfamilyðG; A; CÞ ¼ foutðG0; AÞ j G0 2 maxfamilyðG; A; CÞg:
The cases C = ; and C = A express consistency of output, and its consistency with
input, respectively. In practice, there is no general rule for choosing the specific
instantiation. It all depends on the nature of the particular example we are analyzing.
The instantiation C = A is expedient for those cases where the input describes a
state of affairs that is ‘‘settled’’ as true, and cannot be changed afterwards.16 In such
cases, it makes sense to require that the output be consistent with the input: ‘‘ought’’
implies ‘‘can’’.
Notably, a set of generators and an input do not have a set of propositions as
output, but a set of sets of propositions. So, like in the logics of belief change and
nonmonotonic inference, we can infer a set of propositions by taking either a
credulous or a skeptical approach. In Makinson and van der Torre (2001), the two
15 The contrast between the two approaches is emphasized by Makinson in (2005, pp. 107–108).
16 This reading is related to Hansson’s interpretation of circumstances in so-called dyadic deontic logic
(see Hansson 1969).
Moral particularism in the light of deontic logic
123
Author's personal copy
resulting operations are called full meet and full join constrained output, and they
are noted \ outfamily(G, A, C) and [ outfamily(G, A, C), respectively.
Example 4 below illustrates the notions of maxfamily and outfamily.
Example 4 (Natural conflict) Put G = {(a, x), (a, y)} with C ¼ fx ! :yg and
A = {a}. For all the output operations, out(G, A) = Cn(x, y), which is inconsistent
with C. The maxfamily has two elements {(a, x)} and {(a, y)}, and thus the
outfamily has two elements Cn(x) and Cn(y). Let the final output be calculated using
the full meet operation. We have
\ outfamilyðG; A; CÞ ¼ CnðxÞ \ CnðyÞ ¼ Cnðx _ yÞ
Since no rule has priority over the other, the most that comes is that the disjunction
of x and y is obligatory.
Now I turn to the task of adding priorities. Here I follow the most natural
approach. I assume that conflicts are resolved based on a priority ordering on the
power set of generators, such that only a suitably chosen subset of the maxfamily is
used to generate the output. This is implemented using a relation on sets of rules.
However, in practical applications, one uses a relation on rules, not a relation on sets
of rules. So the question is: given a relation on rules, how can it be lifted to a
relation on sets of rules? The definition of lifting given below is taken from Brass
(1991).17 The relation C is read ‘‘at least as strong as’’, and the superscript s
(mnemonic for ‘‘set’’) is used to distinguish between the two relations.
I assume that C is a pre-order, i.e., the relation is reflexive and transitive.[ denotes
the strengthened complement of C, defined by putting a [ b whenever a C b and
bla: Each of the latter two notions has a counterpart in terms of ordering on sets.
And a 2 S is called a Cs-maximal element of S if, for all b 2 S; b sa implies a Cs b.
Definition 5 (Lifting) Let G be a set of generators equipped with a pre-order C.
For any G1; G2  G; we define G1 Cs G2 to hold if for every d2 2 G2  G1 there is
d1 2 G1  G2 with d1 Cd2.
Different proposals on how to lift an ordering of propositions to sets of
propositions can be found in the literature. Although it is not the purpose of this
paper to assess their relative merits, I will motivate the move from the Horty VV-
definition to the Brass one by means of an example in a moment.
Now comes the main construction.
Definition 6 (Outfamily with priorities) Let A and G be an input set and a set of
generators equipped with a pre-order C, respectively. Let Cs be defined as in
definition 5. We put
– maxfamily(G, A, C) is the set of -maximal subsets G0 of G such that
out(G0, A) is consistent with C
17 Paternity questions are not always easy to answer. I follow Halpern (1997, p. 4), who seems to give
Brass credit for the idea of using such a definition in the area of non-monotonic reasoning. The definition




– filterfamily(G, A, C) is the set of G0 2 maxfamilyðG; A; CÞ that ‘‘maximize’’
the output, i.e., that are such that outðG0; AÞ  outðG00; AÞ for no G00 2 maxfamily
ðG; A; CÞ
– preffamily(G, A, C) is the set of Cs-maximal elements of filterfamily(G, A, C)
– preffamilyd(G, A, C) is the set of elements G
0 of preffamily(G, A, C) stripped of
all the pairs (a, x) that are ‘‘inactive’’ in G0, in the sense that out(G0, A) =
out(G0 - {(a, x)}, A).
The subscript ‘‘d’’ is short for ‘‘distilled’’.
Some further comments on definition 6 are in order. I suggest viewing each
member of the distilled preffamily as the analogue of a proper scenario in Horty’s
theory. There are four steps involved in their construction. We start by determining
the maxfamily. It gathers all the maximal subsets of G whose output remains
consistent with the constraints C. This step is mandatory to guard against possible
contradictions when applying rules to the input set. The filterfamily, then, selects the
elements of the maxfamily with the most informative output, i.e., the elements of
the maxfamily that ‘‘maximize’’ the number of conclusions that can be drawn. This
is needed to avoid an unwanted loss of information created by the threshold idea as
applied to rules. Example 9 below provides a good illustration of this. The
preffamily, then, determines the most preferred elements in the filterfamily by use
of the given priorities between the norms. This step is needed to resolve conflicts
between norms. As will become clear in the treatment of the examples, each
element in the preffamily may contain norms that are in force, but are not triggered.
The last step consists in removing them from the preffamily, because they have no
effect on the output. In Boella and van der Torre (2008), such norms are called
‘‘redundant’’. In the present context I prefer to call them ‘‘inactive’’. Like in Horty’s
framework, the rules in the distilled preffamily tell us what counts as a reason for
what.
Although it is not essential for present purposes, I introduce below the associated
output operation. It can be viewed as the analogue of the notion of extension in
Horty’s account. The subscript p is short for ‘‘preferred’’.
Definition 7 (Preferred output) Let G, A and C be a pre-ordered set of generators,
an input set, and a set of integrity constraints, respectively. We define
x 2 outpðG; AÞ iff x 2 \foutðG0; AÞ j G0 2 preffamilydðG; A; CÞg
Below I apply the account to the examples from Sect. 2, and I show that it yields the
same results as Horty’s.
Example 5 (The book) Let b, s, y and l be instantiated as in example 1. Put
C ¼ fy ! :lg: Let G = {(b, y), (s, l)} with (s, l) [ (b, y).
Case 1 Assume A = {b}. For all output operations, out(G, A) equates
Cn(y), which is consistent with C. In this case, the outfamily/
filterfamily/preffamily has one element {(b, y), (s, l)}. And the distilled
preffamily has one element {(b, y)}, providing b as a reason for y.
Case 2 Assume A = {b, s}. For all output operations, out(G, A) equates
Cn(y, l), and thus it is inconsistent with C. The maxfamily has two
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elements, {(b, y)} and {(s, l)}, and so has the filterfamily. Furthermore,
{(s, l)} [s {(b, y)} since (s, l) [ (b, y). So the preffamily/distilled
preffamily has only one element {(s, l)}, providing s as a reason for l.
Example 6 (The neighbours) Put G ¼ fð>; aÞ; ða; tÞ; ð:a;:tÞg; where a and t are
instantiated as in example 2. Let C be the empty relation, and out 2 fout3; out4g:
Put C = A.
Case 1 A = ;. out(G, A) is Cn(a, t) which is consistent. So the outfamily,
filterfamily and preffamily are the same. They have G as element. And the
distilled preffamily has one element fð>; aÞ; ða; tÞg; providing a as a
reason for t.
Case 2 A ¼ f:ag: outðG; AÞ equates Cnða; t;:tÞ; which is inconsistent. The
outfamily/filterfamily/preffamily has one element fða; tÞ; ð:a;:tÞg: The
distilled preffamily has one element fð:a;:tÞg; providing :a as a reason
for :t:
Example 7 (Multiple level of violation) Put G ¼ fð>;:aÞ; ða; xÞ; ða ^ :x; yÞg;
where a, x and y are instantiated as in example 3. Let C be the empty relation. Put
C = A.
Case 1 A = ;. out(G, A) is Cnð:aÞ which is consistent. The outfamily,
filterfamily and preffamily are the same. They have G as element. And
the distilled preffamily has one element fð>;:aÞg:
Case 2 A = {a}. The outfamily/filterfamily/preffamily has one element fða; xÞ;
ða ^ :x; yÞg: The distilled preffamily has one element {(a, x)}, providing
a as a reason for x.
Case 3 A ¼ fa;:xg: The outfamily/filterfamily/preffamily/distilled preffamily
has one element fða ^ :x; yÞg; providing a ^ :x as a reason for y.
Example 8 below explains why the ‘‘VV’’ definition of lifting has been replaced
with the Brass one. This is a variation on an example by Goble (2011, section 4.1).
Example 8 (Mission) Put G ¼ fð>; aÞ; ð>; bÞ; ð>; cÞg; A ¼ ;; C ¼ fa ! ðb !
:cÞ; a ! :bg and ð>; aÞ[ ð>; bÞ[ ð>; cÞ: Intuitively, the three options are
inconsistent together, and so are the best and the second-best ones. As an
illustration, one might imagine the case of a company who has identified new
business partners in three different cities. An employee of the company (call him
Brown) is asked to go and meet them. a is the obligation to go to London, b is the
obligation to go to Paris, and c to Amsterdam. The ordering tells us how important
to the company the missions are. c is a low priority for them, b is a higher priority
than c, and a is an even higher one. Assume that, for one reason or another, Brown
cannot go to all three cities.18 Given the priorities the company has set, Brown
18 One could imagine that the meetings must be held within a relatively short time frame, and that Brown
is already very busy. He can take at most two consecutive days off within the time frame in question—the
other days he has to attend to his other duties, and these are stronger than the missions he has just been





should go to London and Paris, and postpone his trip to Amsterdam. Now assume
that, for one reason or another, he cannot combine a trip to London with one to
Paris.19 What should he do?
The outfamily and the filterfamily are the same. They have two elements. One is
fð>; aÞ; ð>; cÞg; and the other is fð>; bÞ; ð>; cÞg:
If Cs is defined as in definition 5, then fð>; aÞ; ð>; cÞg[sfð>; bÞ; ð>; cÞg: So the
preffamily and the distilled preffamily have one element fð>; aÞ; ð>; cÞg; and thus
outp(G, A) = Cn(a, c). This is as it should be. The best outweighs the second-best,
when each is combined with the worst. Intuitively, Brown should make the
necessary arrangements to go to both London and Amsterdam.
Now, suppose G1 C
s G2 means that d1 C d2 for each d1 in G1 and d2 in G2. This
alternative definition makes fð>; aÞ; ð>; cÞg and fð>; bÞ; ð>; cÞg incomparable
under Cs. So in that case, the preffamily and the distilled preffamily both contain
fð>; aÞ; ð>; cÞg and fð>; bÞ; ð>; cÞg; and thus outp(G, A) = Cn((a_b)^c). This is
counter-intuitive. It says that c is obligatory along with the disjunction of a and b.
So Brown might comply with his obligation by just making b and c true. Does c not
come last in the ordering? Compared to a, is b not sub-optimal?20
Example 9 below shows why the filterfamily step is needed in definition 6.
Example 9 (The birthday) Assume G ¼ fð>; bÞ; ðb; tÞg; where b denotes the
proposition that I go to a birthday party, and t the proposition that I tell their
organizers that I am coming. Assume the organizers need to know the exact number
of persons who will come. In this respect, ðb; tÞ[ ð>; bÞ: Let out 2 fout3; out4g:
Put A ¼ f:tg and C = A. This means that :t is settled as true. The outfamily has
two elements, fð>; bÞg and fðb; tÞg. The filterfamily has one element fð>; bÞg;
because outðfðb; tÞg; AÞ ¼ Cnð;Þ  outðfð>; bÞg; AÞ ¼ CnðbÞ: So the preffamily
and the distilled preffamily have one element fð>; bÞg; and thus b 2 outpðG; AÞ:
Now take definition 6. Assume the filterfamily step is removed from it, and
the notion of preffamily is amended accordingly: preffamily(G, A, C) is the set of
Cs-maximal elements of maxfamily(G, A, C) (the notion of distilled preffamily
remains the same). Since ðb; tÞ[ ð>; bÞ; the preffamily and the distilled preffamily
have {(b, t)} as unique element, and thus outp(G, A) = Cn(;), which might be
considered to be counter-intuitive.
The reader is invited to verify that Horty’s account yields the same outcome in
example 9. That is, the subset S8 ¼ fð>; bÞg is delivered as unique proper scenario,
and thus b 2 E:
Another interesting feature of the filterfamily step is that it clarifies how the
present account connects with Reiter’s one. We can read each element of G as a
Reiter normal rule a:b/b. So let (G, A) be a Reiter normal default system. Let
extfamily(G, A) denote the family of all the extensions of (G, A) in the sense of
19 One could imagine that a strike in France disrupts flights and rail services between Paris and London.
20 For another illustration, suppose I am in charge of hiring two people. Candidate a is my first choice,
candidate b is my second choice, and candidate c is my third choice. Now, a and b cannot stand each
other, and refuse to work at the same place. They come to me and say ‘‘If you hire him, I will turn your
offer down’’. If I stick to my initial ranking, I will pick up a and c.
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Reiter. Using an observation from Makinson and van der Torre (2000) it is
straightforward to show that the account proposed here is a conservative
generalization of the Reiter account in the following sense.
Remark Let out be out3
?.21 If C is the empty relation, then
extfamilyðG; AÞ ¼ foutðG0; AÞ j G0 2 preffamilyðG; A; CÞg
where C is either A or ;.
Proof The proof is straightforward, combining the observation from Makinson
and van der Torre (2000, section 4) that (for out = out3
?, and C = A or ;)
extfamily(G, A) consists of exactly the maximal (w.r.t. set-inclusion) elements of
outfamily (G, A, C)
extfamilyðG; AÞ ¼ maxðoutfamilyðG; A; CÞÞ
with the observation that
maxðoutfamilyðG; A; CÞÞ ¼ foutðG0; AÞ j G0 2 preffamilyðG; A; CÞg
when C is the empty relation.
Now I present a bottom line example showing why the IOL account is different
from Horty’s one. The specificity of the threshold idea (as opposed to the increment
idea) is brought to the surface in this example. It is the only deontic example I can
think of for which the two accounts do not give the same solution.
Example 10 (Bottom line example, with Horty’s solution) Assume we have the set
G ¼ fða;:bÞ; ða; bÞ; ðb; cÞg with ða;:bÞ\ða; bÞ\ðb; cÞ:
Case 1 Assume A = {a}. In this case, the ordered default theory (A, G, \) yields
S9 = {(a, b), (b, c)} as its unique proper scenario, providing a as a reason
for b, and b as a reason for c.
Case 2 Assume A ¼ fa;:cg: The ordered default theory (A, G, \) yields
S10 = {(a,b)} as its unique proper scenario, hence still providing a as a
reason for b.
Example 11 (Bottom line example, with the IOL solution) The setting is as in
example 10. Let out 2 fout3; out4g: Put C = A.
Case 1 Assume A = {a}. The outfamily and the filterfamily are the same; they
have two elements {(a, b), (b, c)} and fða;:bÞ; ðb; cÞg: We have
fða; bÞ; ðb; cÞg [s fða;:bÞ; ðb; cÞg: So the preffamily/distilled preffamily
has one element {(a, b), (b, c)}, providing a as a reason for b and b as a
reason for c.
Case 2 Assume A ¼ fa;:cg: The outfamily and the filterfamily are the same; they
have two elements {(a, b)} and fða;:bÞ; ðb; cÞg: We have fða;:bÞ;
ðb; cÞg [s fða; bÞg: So the preffamily has one element fða;:bÞ; ðb; cÞg;




and the distilled preffamily has one element fða;:bÞg; hence providing a as
a reason for :b:
In case 2, Horty’s construction keeps the default (a, b), but discards the default
(b, c) because it is conflicted, given that :c is in A. In the IOL framework the pair
(b, c) is kept in the (only) set in preffamily, excluding further addition of
(a, b), given that :c is in A, but allowing further addition of ða;:bÞ:
There is a way to look at the example that makes the IOL solution more intuitive
than Horty’s solution. The question is: shall I do b or not? The ordering
ða;:bÞ\ða; bÞ says that b has priority over :b: So it would seem to follow that I
should do b. But, in reply, it can be said that the ordering (a, b) \ (b, c) says that
compliance with the stronger of the two conflicting norms triggers an obligation of
even higher rank, namely the obligation to do c. Furthermore, c is already (settled
as) false. Hence if I go for b I will put myself in a violation state with respect to a
norm with an even higher rank. I might wish to avoid the violation of the most
important norm. And so I shall not do b. This is the outcome that definition 6
predicts.
Here is a natural language version of the above example that might be of help to
check intuitions.22 Chemotherapy (also known as chemo) is the general term for any
treatment involving the use of chemical agents to stop cancer cells from growing.
For each type of cancer, there is a protocol, which describes in detail the modalities,
the potential complications and the particular precautions that should be taken
during the treatment. Chemo is typically given in cycles, with rest periods between
the cycles. Many doctors agree that sticking to the schedule is the first step to
success. However, it is often necessary for physicians to postpone chemo. This
usually happens when the patient has a low White Blood Cell (WBC) count.
According to the textbook (Mehta and Bansal 2004),
‘‘Chemotherapy should be discontinued or postponed if the total WBC counts
drop below 3,500/mm3.’’ (Mehta and Bansal 2004, p. 144)
White blood cells are part of the body’s defense against disease. Chemotherapy may
reduce patients’ WBC count, making them vulnerable to infection, including life-
threatening infection, especially among the elderly.23 There are drugs (called WBCs
growth factors) physicians can prescribe to help preserve WBCs during chemo.
However, they cannot always be administrated. For instance, the drug called
‘‘Neulasta’’24 is contraindicated in patients with a history of serious allergic
reactions to pegfilgrastim or filgrastim. If it is true that sticking to the prescribed
chemo schedule is the first step to success, then (in the case of abnormalities) the
best is to administer a WCBs booster. And, if (for some reason or another) this
22 Thanks to Marek Sergot for suggesting me this example, though perhaps not in these exacts terms.
23 Chemotherapy works by killing fast-growing cancer cells. Unfortunately, chemotherapy drugs cannot
always tell the difference between cancer cells and fast-growing healthy cells, including red and white
blood cells.
24 http://www.neulasta.com/.
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cannot be done, the second best is to postpone chemo until the passage of time
brings WBCs count back to a safe level.
In this medical example, the following instantiations suggest themselves: a is for
the set of data used to set up the treatment. b is for receiving chemo as per the
protocol. This one contains very specific information on e.g. the dosage, the day, the
hour, the order and the duration of drug administration. And c is for keeping WBCs
count to a safe level using a drug. In the extreme case where having one more
chemo means certain death for the patient, surely enough the oncologist will decide
to interrupt the treatment.
This is also an example of polarity reversal. In case 1, the consideration a is a
reason for b, and b is a reason for c. In case 2, a is no longer a reason for b, and b is
no longer a reason for c. Hence Horty’s theory gets the polarity reversal right in
simple cases of reason holism, but appears not to be well-suited for slightly more
complex cases like this one, where more than two norms collide—viz. where two
obligations conflict, and disregard for the more important one is the only way to
avoid the violation of an even more important obligation.
Clearly there is a disagreement between the two accounts. How should it be
diagnosed? Here is a possible explanation—there might be others. Dancy believes
that reasons behave the same way whether epistemic or deontic. It is even this very
belief that led him to formulate the moral particularism thesis.25 Horty seems to
follow this line. First, he suggests using the same notation for both kinds of reason,
and warns the reader that throughout the discussion he will switch back and forth,
rather casually, between the two readings (see Horty 2007b, p. 4). Next, in order to
account for the valence-switching capacity of deontic reasons, Horty uses a
mechanism initially devised for and tailored to the epistemic domain. A default is
disregarded when its head is inconsistent with the facts, either directly or indirectly
(using reasons that have previously been accepted). This feature is the main reason
why in case 2 of example 10 the theory supports an arguably unintuitive scenario. In
the epistemic domain, it makes sense to disregard a default for the sole reason that
its head appears to be inconsistent with the rest of the data. Indeed the latter provide
an exception to the normality claim the default reason in question rests on. What of
the deontic domain? The conventional wisdom is to assume that deontic reasons run
parallel to epistemic reasons. It makes perfect sense to assume such a parallelism, at
least in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary. Prima facie such an
assumption is useful too, for it allows to transfer well-defined and well-documented
techniques from one area to the other. However, if correct, the bottom line example
casts doubt on the latter assumption. Here lies, I believe, the explanation. To say
that holism is a general phenomenon that applies to both normative and epistemic
reasons is one thing. To say that reasons behave the same way whether epistemic or
normative is another thing.
One would make a stronger statement, by showing that there is a sensible
interpretation suggesting that for epistemic reasons the solution supplied by the
Horty account is the correct one. The reliability interpretation outlined in Horty
25 In Dancy (2006, chapter 4.2), he points out that holism is uncontested for epistemic reasons, and




(2007a, p. 391) might be the one. Under the latter interpretation, each default
indicates something like a high conditional probability that its conclusion is
satisfied, and the priority ordering measures relative strength of these conditional
probabilities. Turning back to the example, the default (a, b), call it d2, tells us that
b follows with a high probability, given that a holds. The potential competing
argument ða;:bÞ; call it d1, has no force. For d1 supports not-b given a less strongly
than d2 supports b given a. Not-c has no force either. It is true that the default reason
(b, c), call it d3, supports c given b more strongly than d2 supports b given a.
However, the contrapositive of d3, ‘‘if not-c then not-b’’ is logically unrelated to it,
and cannot be used to defeat d2.
26 The solution that is naturally suggested by the
reliability interpretation is, thus, the outcome predicted by the Horty account.
There is a possible escape to the bottom line example.27 Horty (2007, p. 391, 394)
distinguishes between a conditional command and the (unconditional, categorical)
command of a conditional. A conditional command has the form (a, x), while the
command of a conditional has the form ð>; a ! xÞ; where? is material implication.
I am not able to explain (in terms of reasons) the difference in meaning between the
two. But let us see what happens if the bottom line example is represented as
imperatives of conditionals rather than as conditional imperatives. Suppose the input
is A = {a}. In that case, the unique proper scenario associated with the default theory
is S11 ¼ fð>; a ! bÞ; ð>; b ! cÞg: At the first stage all the defaults are triggered. At
the second stage the default ð>; a ! :bÞ is conflicted since A [ hðS11Þ ‘ a ^ b: Now
suppose the input is A ¼ fa;:cg: In that case, the unique proper scenario associated
with the default theory is S12 ¼ fð>; a ! :bÞ; ð>; b ! cÞg: At the first stage all the
defaults are triggered. At the second stage ð>; a ! bÞ is conflicted in S12. On the
other hand, the counter-intuitive S13 ¼ fð>; a ! bÞg is no longer supported. This is
because ð>; a ! bÞ is defeated by ð>; b ! cÞ in S13. Therefore, if the bottom line
example is represented as imperatives of conditionals rather than as conditional
imperatives, then Horty’s account gives the right result.
I note an apparent oddity. The rule ð>; b ! cÞ cannot be removed from the proper
scenario S12. This is because ð>; a ! :bÞ is defeated by ð>; a ! bÞ in S#12 ¼
fð>; a ! :bÞg; although it is not in S12.28 There was the question of explaining (in
terms of reasons) the difference in meaning between a conditional command of the
form (a, x) and its counterpart in the ‘command of a conditional’ language ð>; a !
xÞ: There is now the related question of explaining what the function of the proper
scenario is under the ‘command of a conditional’ interpretation. I would say that it
must be enlarged to include counterfactual thinking. The proper scenario gathers the
reasons that are binding in a given context, but also (sometimes) tells us what would
26 For illustration purposes, assume that these conditional probabilities encode statistical assertions about
some population groups, and instantiate a, b and c into (this is the classical example of non-transitivity of
default rules) being a student, being an adult, and being employed. The fact that I am unemployed does
not imply that I am not an adult.
27 I am indebted to Jeff Horty for drawing this possible reply to my attention.
28 Why should the presence of ð>; b ! cÞ in the current scenario make a difference? This is essentially
due to the consistency requirement in condition b) of the definition for defeat, viz the restriction according
to which A [ h(SS0/D0) should be consistent. Take D0 ¼ fð>; a ! bÞg: The only S0 that qualifies is
fð>; a ! :bÞg: A [ hððS#12  S0Þ [ D0 is consistent, but A [ h((S12 - S0)[ D0) is not.
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qualify as a reason for what if the context was different. Here b would have counted as
a good reason for c in other circumstances.
The move to the ‘command of a conditional’ idiom is perfectly possible. Still, the
question comes up to what extent independent motivation can be given for it. I am
not able to provide one. Noticeably, the translation into the ‘command of a
conditional’ idiom gives the contraposition of every rule with exceptions as long as
it is part of a proper scenario. This is illustrated with example 12 below.
Example 12 (Contraposition) A ¼ f:xg; G ¼ fð>; a ! xÞg: The proper scenario
is S14 ¼ fð>; a ! xÞg; and thus :a 2 E:
Generally, authors agree in thinking that an appropriate translation of rules
should not give the automatic contraposition of the rules.29 The following example,
due to Hansen (2008, section 3.2), shows that contraposition is undesirable for
obligations.
Example 13 (Best suit) A ¼ f:cg; and G ¼ fð>; a ! bÞ; ð>;:a ! cÞg; where
a, b, and c represent the respective propositions that it rains, that I wear a rain coat,
and that I wear my best suit. The proper scenario is S15 ¼ fð>; a ! bÞ; ð>;:a !
cÞg; and thus b 2 E: In the event that I cannot wear my best suit (e.g., it is in the
laundry), it seems strange to say that I should wear a rain coat.
Therefore, as a general policy, the translation into the ‘conditional command’
idiom should be preferred unless something goes wrong with it—in which case the
translation into the other idiom becomes appropriate. Still, some might find such a
move somewhat ad hoc, if no independent motivation can be given to support it.
One last remark. I have taken the standard approach to be proceeding in increment
steps, and I have suggested that the latter method is not well-suited to deal with
obligations. As a matter of facts, it is possible to imagine variations on the increment
method. One such variation in the literature is worth a mention, because it gives the
same solution for the bottom line example as the I/O account. It is the increment
method of Hansen (2008, section 5.2). When building the preferred subset of norms,
the idea is to check for the collective ‘‘obeyability’’ of the defaults, rather than their
collective consistency as done in most non-monotonic frameworks. This is
implemented by testing for consistency not the heads of the rules, but their
materializations. In the particular case where the ordering is total, the procedure boils
down to the following. Suppose the rules in G are ordered in the matter written,
g1; g2; g3; . . .; the convention being that concatenation is value decreasing: each
element in the sequence takes priority over its immediate successor. Define the
preferred maximally obeyable subset G  G of norms from a sequence of subsets,
Gn, thus:
– G0 = ;
– Gnþ1 ¼ Gn [ fgnþ1g if A [ mðGn [ fgnþ1gÞ is consistentGn otherwise

– G ¼ [fGn : n\xg
29 Cf. e.g. Lewis (1973, section 1.8), Adams (1975, chapter 1), Bennet (2003, chapter 59), Makinson




I give without proof the solution we obtain for the bottom line example. If
A = {a}, then G ¼ fða; bÞ; ðb; cÞg. If A ¼ fa;:cg; then G ¼ fða;:bÞ; ðb; cÞg.
Troublesome for the account is, I think, the birthday scenario (example 9).
We have G ¼ fð>; bÞ; ðb; tÞg with ðb; tÞ[ ð>; bÞ and A ¼ f:tg. Since
ðb; tÞ[ ð>; bÞ; ðb; tÞ is added first, preventing the further addition of ð>; bÞ: Hence
G ¼ fðb; tÞg.
5 Conclusion
This paper focused on the divide between particularism and generalism, and argued
for a middle ground position between these two extremes. This view was already
defended by Horty, who made his point by showing (pace Dancy) that reason
holism does not imply particularism. The aim of this paper was to strengthen
Horty’s argument. In the literature only the notion of prima facie obligation has
been used to motivate reason holism. I strengthened Horty’s point, by first showing
that contrary-to-duties provide another independent support for reason holism, and
then outlining a formal theory that is able to capture these two sources of holism.
While in simple settings the proposed account coincides with Horty’s one, this is not
true in more complicated or ‘‘realistic’’ settings in which more than two norms
collide.
The aim of the paper was more general than just comparing two particular logical
systems. Its purpose was to contrast two strategies of formalizing defeasible deontic
reasoning. The first one, referred to as the ‘‘increment’’ idea, has been around for a
while in the non-monotonic literature. It consists in restraining the step-by-step
application of defaults. The second one, referred to as the ‘‘threshold’’ idea, is much
less known, and certainly deserves further study. It consists in cutting back the set of
defaults to just below the threshold of yielding excess. Comparing the two
approaches to see if one provides a better account of the valence-switching capacity
of reasons, we have seen that in the main example where their outcomes differ, the
intuitions seem to favor the outcome of the second strategy. The comparison has
given rise to a more general observation. It is that the commonly made assumption
that normative reasons run parallel to epistemic ones is not as plausible as might
seem at first sight.
Needless to say, much work remains to be done to get a full-blooded formal
account. For one thing, I have been concentrated on two specific frameworks. Future
studies should include alternative approaches available from the default logic
literature (like those documented in Delgrande et al. (2004)). And a wider set of
examples might be used to test and compare the approaches. For another,
axiomatisation would be a good way of exporting deontic logic to moral
particularism. However, just as default logic lacks a proof-theory, so also constrained
I/O logic lacks a proof-theory. This issue must be left for future research.
Of course, I do not claim that the threshold approach is completely free of
technical problems, especially when it comes to epistemic reasons. For instance,
I can think of an epistemic scenario that is structurally different from the one I have
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mostly been concerned with in this paper, and for which the I/O account does not
provide the correct solution. It is the Microsoft example from Horty (2001). Earlier I
mentioned this example in connection with argumentation theory. There is
something peculiar about the scenario. It is that the consequent of the least
preferred default is logically stronger than that of the most preferred default. Since
the example is somewhat involved I use mnemonic abbreviations, focusing on a
particular individual, Beth, and letting NMEb, MEb, 1Mb, and 1
2
Mb represent the
respective propositions that Beth is a new Microsoft employee, a Microsoft
employee, millionaire, and has half a million dollars.











Mbg. The input is that Beth is a new Microsoft employee. As a first and very weak
default, we have that (in virtue of stock options accrued over the years) Microsoft
employees (including Beth) are millionaires. As a slightly stronger default, we have
that new Microsoft employees have not yet accumulated so much as half a million
dollars. As a third and very strong default, we have that Beth does happen to have
half a million dollars.





MbÞg. The former is in the
preffamily and the distilled preffamily, but not the latter. Therefore outpðG;NMEbÞ¼
Cnð1Mb;1
2
MbÞ.30 Intuitively, we would expect outpðG;NMEbÞ¼Cnð12MbÞ:
The reader is invited to verify that, on Horty’s account, the subset S16 ¼
fð>; 1
2
MbÞg is delivered as unique proper scenario.
I do not claim that one and the same formalism should be able to deal with both
epistemic and deontic reasons. Unless one can instantiate the scenario in the deontic
realm, I will not worry too much about the latter finding. At first, it corroborates
further that deontic and epistemic reasons do not operate the same way. Now, just
supposing someone can come up with a deontic illustration, there might be a way
around in I/O logic. One might pre-process the set of generators in order to ‘‘freeze’’
the application of the less preferred/specific default. Call (a, x) a safe (there might
be a better name in the present context) element of G if (a, x) is not a minimal
element (under C) of any minimal (under ) subset of G whose output is
inconsistent with C. Write Gs for the set of safe elements of G. The idea is to assume
that definition 6 is applied to Gs rather than G itself. In the example, we have
Gs ¼ fðNMEb;: 12 MbÞ; ð>; 12 MbÞg; and thus the final solution is fð>; 12 MbÞg as
required. It remains to be seen whether the pre-processing idea would always give
the right result.
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